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Abstract
In a deterministic quantum key distribution (DQKD) protocol with a two-way quantum channel,
Bob sends a qubit to Alice who then encodes a key bit onto the qubit and sends it back to Bob.
After measuring the returned qubit, Bob can obtain Alice’s key bit immediately, without basis
reconciliation. Since an eavesdropper may attack the qubits traveling on either the Bob-Alice
channel or the Alice-Bob channel, the security analysis of DQKD with a two-way quantum channel
is complicated and its unconditional security has been controversial. This paper presents a security
proof of a single-photon four-state DQKD against general attacks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography enables two remote parties to share an information-theoretically
secure key, which can be used for later cryptographic applications. Since the pioneering
protocol was presented by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (called the BB84 protocol) [1],
its security against general attacks has been studied in idealized settings [2–4] and also
in practical settings [5]. Meanwhile, a deterministic quantum key distribution (DQKD)
protocol with a two-way quantum channel has been proposed [6, 7], which allows Alice
and Bob to encode and decode secret message in a deterministic manner. Bob can obtain
Alice’s key bit directly with his measurement outcomes, without a basis reconciliation step,
which makes key distribution efficient and even a quasi-secure direct communication possible
when the two parties are connected with an ideal two-way quantum channel [6, 8]. As
for experimental demonstrations, DQKD protocols without entanglement, e.g., the single-
photon two-state DQKD [9] and the single-photon four-state DQKD [10] (we call it the four-
state protocol hereafter), were proposed. Although the security of the four-state protocol
against some special individual attacks has been considered [11], its security against general
attacks has not been proved [12].
The difficulty of the security proof for the DQKD against general attacks is due to the
use of a two-way quantum channel. In BB84, a qubit just travels from Alice to Bob once,
carrying one-bit secret information. Upon receiving the qubits, Bob measures it in either
of the alternative bases to obtain Alice’s key bits. A powerful eavesdropper, Eve, whose
capacity is only limited by the physical laws, may attack the information-carrying qubit in
the one-way quantum channel. In the DQKD [6], however, a qubit departs from Bob to Alice
(the forward channel, Bob-Alice), and then it carries Alice’s secret key bits back to Bob (the
backward channel, Alice-Bob). In this case, Eve might attack the qubits traveling on both
the Bob-Alice and Alice-Bob channels. Comparing it with BB84, the security analysis of
DQKD is complicated and its unconditional security has not been proved before [12]. In
fact, the security of two-way DQKD has been challenged over time (see, e.g., [7, 13–15]).
Some of these challenges have led to refinement of the protocol and some have been refuted
[12]. In this paper, we present a security proof of the four-state protocol against general
attacks, thus, confirming the unconditional security of the protocol.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we introduce the four-state protocol. Next
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in Sec. III, we present the security proof and final key generation rate against collective
attacks. Then we extend our security proof and key generation against general attacks. We
finally conclude in Sec. IV.
II. FOUR-STATE PROTOCOL
The four-state protocol works as follows.
1. Bob prepares n qubits randomly in one of the four states, |0〉, |1〉, |+〉, and |−〉, where
|±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2 and sends them to Alice.
2. In the check mode, Alice randomly measures part of the received states in the X or
Z basis.
3. In the encoding mode, Alice randomly performs the unitary operations I = |0〉〈0| +
|1〉〈1| (bit 0) or Y = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0| (bit 1) on the rest received states.
4. Alice sends the encoded qubits back to Bob. It is interesting to note that Y {|0〉, |1〉} =
{−|1〉, |0〉}, and Y {|+〉, |−〉} = {|−〉,−|+〉}, so Bob measures each qubit in the same
basis as the one he used for preparation. In this way, Bob can obtain Alice’s key bits
deterministically, without basis reconciliation [9–11].
5. After Bob measures all returned qubits, Alice announces her measurement results
in the check mode. They compute the fidelity of the forward states with results of
consistent-basis measurements, i.e., Alice measures the forward state in the same basis
as Bob’s preparing it. For instance, when Bob sends a state |0〉 and Alice measures it
in the Z-basis in check mode, with a probability of f0, Alice’s measurement outcome
is |0〉. Similarly, they can calculate the fidelity f1, f+, and f− of |1〉, |+〉, and |−〉,
respectively. Alice and Bob discard results from the inconsistent-basis measurements.
6. Alice announces partial of her key bits in the encoding mode. They compute the error
rate e in the Alice-Bob channel.
7. If Alice and Bob find the error rates in the Bob-Alice channel are not too high (sat-
isfying Eq. (9)), they will continue the protocol, i.e., Alice and Bob will perform
3
error correction (EC) and privacy amplification (PA) to gain the secure final key bits.
Otherwise, we assume Alice and Bob will abort the protocol.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Eve’s attack in the Alice-Bob channel
Suppose that Eve only attacks the qubits in the Alice-Bob channel. Bob prepares the
forward qubits randomly in the state |0〉, |1〉, |+〉, and |−〉 with the same probability, i.e.,
the forward qubit is prepared in a mixed state, ρB = (|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|+ |+〉〈+|+ |−〉〈−|)/4 =
(|0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1|)/2. To gain Alice’s key bits information, Eve has to distinguish Alice’s
encoded qubit ρB0 = Iρ
BI from ρB1 = Y ρ
BY in the Alice-Bob channel. Since ρB0 = ρ
B
1 =
(|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|)/2, Eve cannot gain any information about Alice’s key bits if she only attacks
the qubits after Alice’s encoding operation. Therefore, we can conclude that Eve has to
attack the qubits traveling on both the Bob-Alice and Alice-Bob channels in order to gain
Alice’s key bits.
B. Eve’s attack in the Bob-Alice Channel
Eve’s most general quantum operation can be described by a unitary operation together
with an ancilla [17]. In the Bob-Alice channel, when Bob sends a qubit in state |0〉 and Alice
measures in the basis |0〉, |1〉, she will get the measurement outcomes |0〉 with probability
c200, or |1〉 with probability c201. Define f0 = c200 as the fidelity of state |0〉, which can be
verified by Alice and Bob in their post-processing. Similarly, Alice and Bob can obtain
f1 = c
2
11, f+ = c
2
++, and f− = c
2
−−, respectively. Since the state space of the forward qubit is
two-dimensional, Eve’s most general attack in the Bob-Alice channel can be written in the
form,
UBE |0〉B|E〉 = c00|0〉B|E00〉+ c01|1〉B|E01〉,
UBE |1〉B|E〉 = c11|1〉B|E11〉+ c10|0〉B|E10〉,
(1)
and
UBE |+〉B|E〉 = c++|+〉B|E++〉+ c+−|−〉B|E+−〉,
UBE |−〉B|E〉 = c−−|−〉B|E−−〉+ c−+|+〉B|E−+〉,
(2)
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where cij and c±± can be treated as no-negative real numbers [22], and |Eij〉 and |E±±〉
forms four pairs of normalized vectors. For now, we consider the case that Eve performs a
collective attack, i.e., UBE are the same for all qubits. This restriction can be removed with
quantum de Finetti theorem [16, 18, 19], and then we can prove the four-state protocol is
secure against general attacks.
As discussed above, Bob’s forward qubit is prepared in a mixed state ρB = (|0〉〈0| +
|1〉〈1|)/2. After Eve’s attack in the Bob-Alice channel, the joint state of the forward qubit
and Eve’s ancilla becomes
ρBEBob−Alice = UBE
(
ρB ⊗ |E〉〈E|)UBE .
After receiving the forward qubits, in the encoding mode, Alice will encode her key bits
onto the forward qubit. With probability p = 1/2, she encodes key bit 0 by the operation
IB or key bit 1 by the operation YB. After the encoding, the state of the qubit and Eve’s
ancilla becomes
ρABE =
1
2
|0〉〈0|A ⊗ ρBE0 +
1
2
|1〉〈1|A ⊗ ρBE1 , (3)
where ρBE0 = ρ
BE
Bob−Alice, and ρ
BE
1 = YBρ
BE
Bob−AliceYB. Next, Alice sends the encoded qubits
back to Bob.
After Bob measured all the returned qubits, Alice will announce her measurement out-
comes in the check mode, so that they can gain the fidelity of Bob’s forward states, f0, f1,
f+, and f− in the Bob-Alice channel. Alice will also publish some of her key bits to gain the
error rate e of the key bits in the Alice-Bob channel. For simplicity, we will first consider
the case that f0 = f1 and f+ = f−.
C. Secret key generation
The asymptotic key generation rate can be defined as r = limm→∞ k(m)/m, where m is
the size of the raw key and k(m) is the number of the final key bits. Alice sends Bob EC
information over a classical channel so that he can correct his raw key to match Alice’s.
This EC information is encrypted using pre-shared secret key bits and thus is unknown
to Eve. The final key is then derived by applying two-universal hashing to their common
raw key as PA [20]. In the asymptotic scenario, the secure key rate rPA for secret key
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generation is bounded by the conditional entropy of Alice and Bob’s key bits given the
quantum information of Eve about the key bits, rPA = S(ρ
A|ρBE).
After Alice’s encoding operations, Eve can gain some quantum information about Alice’s
key bit from the quantum state ρBE = trAρ
ABE that is a joint state of the backward qubit
and her ancilla. Here, we assume the worst case that Eve uses the entire state ρBE to gain
information about the key bit, even though she may have to send part of the state to Bob.
With Renner and Ko¨nig’s results [20], we have rPA = S(ρ
A|ρBE) = S(ρABE) − S(ρBE),
where S(ρABE) = −trρABE log2 ρABE , and S(ρBE) = −trρBE log2 ρBE . In the following, we
should calculate the eigenvalues of ρABE and ρBE to get S(ρABE) and S(ρBE).
D. Key generation rate for PA
Let us denote that
〈E00|E01〉 = s0 + is1,
〈E00|E10〉 = u0 + iu1,
〈E00|E11〉 = p0 + ip1,
〈E11|E10〉 = r0 + ir1,
〈E01|E11〉 = v0 + iv1,
〈E01|E10〉 = q0 + iq1,
(4)
where pi, qi, ri, si, ui and vi are real number. Taking the inner product of two equations of
Eq.(1) gives
c00c10〈E10|E00〉+ c11c01〈E01|E11〉 = 0. (5)
For simplicity, we rewrite c0 ≡ c00 = c11 and c1 ≡ c01 = c10 and thus we have u0 = −v0 and
u1 = −v1.
Let us calculate S(ρABE) and S(ρBE). A straightforward computation [23] shows that
the eigenvalues of ρABE can be obtained as λABE0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 = 0 and λ
ABE
12,13,14,15 = 1/4.
Thus, we obtain S(ρABE) =
∑
i λ
ABE
i log2 λ
ABE
i = 2, where we have used the convention
0 log2 0 = 0. The eigenvalues of ρ
BE = trAρ
ABE are λBE0,1,2,3, = 0, λ
BE
4 =
1
4
[1 + (∆1 + ∆2)],
λBE5 =
1
4
[1 + (∆1 − ∆2)], λBE6 = 14 [1 − (∆1 + ∆2)] and λBE7 = 14 [1 − (∆1 − ∆2)],
where ∆1 =
√
(c20p0 + c
2
1q0)
2 + (c20p1 + c
2
1q1)
2 + c20c
2
1(s0 + r0)
2 and ∆2 =
√
c20c
2
1(s0 − r0)2
[24]. Considering the concavity of von Neumann entropy [17], we can find S(ρBE) =
6
−∑i λBEi log2 λBEi approaches its maximum when r0 = s0 = q1 = p1 = 0. In this case,
we have λBE4,5 =
1
4
[1 + (c20p0 + c
2
1q0)] and λ
BE
6,7 =
1
4
[1− (c20p0 + c21q0)] [25].
With the eigenvalues of ρABE and ρBE , we get
S(ρABE) = 2,
S(ρBE) = −
∑
i
λBEi log2 λ
BE
i .
From Eqs. (1) and (2), we can get
2c++|E++〉 = c00|E00〉+ c01|E01〉+ c11|E11〉+ c10|E10〉.
2c+−|E+−〉 = c00|E00〉 − c01|E01〉 − c11|E11〉+ c10|E10〉,
2c−−|E−−〉 = c00|E00〉 − c01|E01〉+ c11|E11〉 − c10|E10〉,
2c−+|E−+〉 = c00|E00〉+ c01|E01〉 − c11|E11〉 − c10|E10〉.
When considering f+ = f−, the equations above give a crucial boundary condition,
1 + c20p0 + c
2
1q0 = 2c
2
++. (6)
Let us analyze the maximum of S(ρBE) when the fidelity, c20 and c
2
++, were verified by Alice
and Bob in their post-processing.
With the boundary condition of Eq.(6) and −1 ≤ p0, q0 ≤ 1, after some tedious calcula-
tion, we obtain that c20p0+ c
2
1p1 ≥ 2c2++− 1− 2c21 [26] and S(ρBE) approaches the maximum
when c20p0+ c
2
1p1 = 2c
2
++− 1− 2c21 ≥ 0. After verifying the condition c2++− c21 ≥ 1/2 in their
post-processing, Alice and Bob can obtain
S(ρBE) = max
{
S(ρBE |p0, q0)
}
= − 2c
2
++ − 2c21
2
log2
2c2++ − 2c21
4
− 2− 2c
2
++ + 2c
2
1
2
log2
2− 2c2++ + 2c21
4
. (7)
Therefore, after verifying c2++ − c21 ≥ 1/2 Alice and Bob can get the rate of PA against
collective attacks,
rPA(ξ) = S(ρ
A|ρBE) = 1− h(ξ), (8)
where ξ = c2++−c21, and h(x) = −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the binary Shannon entropy.
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In particular, if Eve does not attack the forward qubits in the Bob-Alice channel, i.e.,
f0 = f1 = f+ = f− = 1, one can find that rPA(ξ) = 1. This states that Eve cannot gain any
information about Alice’s key bits if she doesn’t attack the travel qubit in the Bob-Alice
channel first.
Consider the case that Eve measures each forward qubit in the Bob-Alice channel in the
basis |0〉, |1〉. Alice and Bob can verify that f0 = f1 = 1, and f+ = f− = 1/2. In this case,
we have rPA(ξ) = 0. On the other hand, Eve can also measure each forward qubit in the
Bob-Alice channel in the basis |+〉, |−〉, which gives f+ = f− = 1 and f0 = f1 = 1/2, and
thus rPA(ξ) = 0. That is, Eve can gain full information of Alice’s key bits if she has exactly
known the forward states before Alice’s encoding operations.
E. PA for the practical quantum channels
For the practical quantum channels, the condition f0 = f1 and f+ = f− is too strict to be
satisfied. We can use the following strategy to symmetrize Eve’s channels and eliminate this
condition. We first identify four locations — Alice’s side and Bob’s side of the Bob-Alice
and Alice-Bob channels. For each bit, we randomly insert a bit flip operation Y at these
four locations. So the four locations are either all Y or all I. In this way, the fidelities of
the new the Bob-Alice channel are simply the average of that of the original line [i.e., the
new f0 and f1 (f+ and f−) are the average of the old f0 and f1 (f+ and f−)] [27]. Thus,
this justifies the conditions f0 = f1 and f+ = f− used in the previous sections.
Now, let us simplify further. Consider the two Y operations at Alice’s side located
before and after Alice’s encoding operation. Since Alice’s encoding performs either Y or I,
the two new Y operations commute with Alice’s encoding operation and cancel out. Now
consider the two Y operations at Bob’s side, if he originally wants to send bit b = 0, 1 in
basis W = X,Z through the the Bob-Alice channel, he now sends bit 1 − b in basis W to
implement Y . When he receives the qubit from the channel Alice-Bob, he performs Y on
the incoming qubit, measures in basis W , records the bit b′, and computes b⊕ b′ as Alice’s
key bit. This is the same as his measuring the incoming qubit in W , flipping the bit result
1−b′ to b′, and computing b⊕b′ as Alice’s key bit. Note that the input to the raw Bob-Alcie
channel is 1− b in the basis W and the output of the raw Alice-Bob channel is measured in
W resulting in bit 1 − b′. Thus, Bob can use this information directly to infer Alice’s key
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bit as (1− b)⊕ (1− b′) = b⊕ b′ without actually implementing the two Y operations. Since
b is uniformly distributed, so is 1 − b and the original protocol is recovered (i.e., no need
to introduce the extra four Y operations) except that the averages of the fidelities (instead
of the individual fidelities) determined in the check mode are used in the key generation
formulas. Specifically, we can use ξ = f+,− + f0,1 − 1 in Eq. (8) to calculate PA for any
quantum channels in the four-state protocol, where f0,1 = (c
2
00+c
2
11)/2, f+,− = (c
2
+++c
2
−−)/2,
and c2ij’s are the original fidelities of the Bob-Alice channel determined in the check mode.
F. Final key generation rate
In the post-processing, Alice and Bob should estimate the fidelity in the Bob-Alice chan-
nel, and e in the Alice-Bob channel. Then they will perform EC and PA to generate the
final key bits. In an asymptotic scenario, after verifying
f+,− + f0,1 ≥ 3/2, (9)
Alice and Bob can obtain the secure final key against collective attacks with the generation
rate
r = 1− h(ξ)− h(e), (10)
where h(e) is the amount of key bits Alice and Bob should sacrifice in EC. To compare the
key rate performance of the two-way DQKD given by Eq. (10) to that of BB84 given by
1−2h(e), we can assume a symmetric attack by Eve in the DQKD case (in which c2++ = 1−e
and c21 = e) so that ξ = 1 − 2e. Thus, the key rate of DQKD is 1 − h(2e) − h(e) which is
smaller than that of BB84 when there are errors.
G. Security against general attacks
Our analysis above assumes that the state ρABE of each run of the system is independent
of and identical to the states of other runs, i.e., we assume the entire state for the n runs is
(ρABE)⊗n. This collective-attack result can be extended to general attacks where the entire
state is arbitrary without any restriction on the n subsystems. Note that the four-state
protocol is unchanged with a randomized permutation step. In light of ref. [18, 19], after
permuting the n subsystems and discarding k of them, the resulting n−k subsystems can be
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approximated by n− k independent and identically distributed subsystems [28]. Therefore,
the final key bits in our proof with the generation rate in Eq.(10) are secure against general
attacks.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have proved that the four-state protocol is secure against general attacks, thus ending
the long-standing dispute about the security of the deterministic QKD protocols. Our work
may be extended to other QKD protocols with a two-way quantum channel and shine new
light on the universality of QKD.
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